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4.1 Introduction
The free movement of capital can have widespread beneﬁts. Capital in-
ﬂows can provide ﬁnancing for high-return investment, thereby raising
growth rates. Capital inﬂows—especially in the form of direct invest-
ment—often bring improved technology, management techniques, and ac-
cess to international networks, all of which further raise productivity and
growth. Capital outﬂows can allow domestic citizens and companies to
earn higher returns and better diversify risk, thereby reducing volatility in
consumption and income. Capital inﬂows and outﬂows can increase mar-
ket discipline, thereby leading to a more eﬃcient allocation of resources
and higher productivity growth. In order to obtain these widespread ben-
eﬁts of free capital ﬂows, most developed countries and many developing
countries have lifted most of their capital controls.
In the spring of 1997 there was such widespread support for free capital
ﬂows that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Interim Committee
suggested amending the IMF’s Articles of Agreement to extend its juris-
diction to include capital movements and make capital account liberal-
ization a purpose of the IMF.1 Soon after this recommendation was an-
nounced, however, a series of ﬁnancial crises spread across Asia and
disproportionately aﬀected countries that had recently liberalized their
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1. The IMF’s charter requires that member countries have convertible currencies for the
purposes of current account transactions, but not capital account transactions.capital accounts. In contrast, several Asian countries that had maintained
more stringent capital controls—such as China and India—emerged from
the crisis relatively unscathed. These experiences caused a reassessment of
the desirability of capital controls, especially for emerging markets and de-
veloping economies.
In a sharp sea change, many policymakers and leading economists now
support the use of capital controls, especially taxes on capital inﬂows, in
some circumstances. For example, former U.S. Treasury Secretary Robert
Rubin, who actively encouraged emerging markets to open their capital
accounts in the mid-1990s, has expressed support for controls on capital
inﬂows.2 A series of reports by the Group of Twenty-Two (G22) in 1998
raised concerns about capital account liberalization and cautiously en-
dorsed taxes on capital inﬂows.3 Even the Economist magazine, tradition-
ally a supporter of the free movement of goods and capital, wrote: “some
kinds of restriction on inﬂows (not outﬂows) of capital will make sense for
many developing countries....   Chile’s well-known system . . . was a suc-
cess worth emulating” (Economist 2003). Possibly even more surprising,
senior oﬃcials from the IMF, formerly the bastion of capital market liber-
alization, have expressed support for taxes on capital inﬂows. For example,
Stanley Fischer, former ﬁrst deputy managing director of the IMF, stated:
“The IMF has cautiously supported the use of market-based capital inﬂow
controls, Chilean style” (Fischer 2001).
One of the most common justiﬁcations for this sea change in attitudes
and the recent support for capital controls is the lack of empirical evidence
on the beneﬁts of capital account liberalization. If lifting capital controls
does yield net beneﬁts, then these beneﬁts should be measurable and iden-
tiﬁable in empirical analysis. Although an extensive literature has at-
tempted to measure the macroeconomic eﬀects of capital account liberal-
ization, this literature is generally interpreted as being inconclusive. For
example, a recent survey of the empirical literature on capital controls by
authors in the IMF research department concludes: “if ﬁnancial integra-
tion has a positive eﬀect on growth, there is as yet no clear and robust em-
pirical proof that the eﬀect is quantitatively signiﬁcant” (Prasad et al.
2003). Similarly, Eichengreen (2001) writes: “Capital account liberaliza-
tion, it is fair to say, remains one of the most controversial and least un-
derstood policies of our day....   Empirical analysis has failed to yield con-
clusive results.”
This interpretation that the empirical evidence on capital controls is in-
conclusive, however, overlooks a number of recent studies using microeco-
nomic data. These studies provide persuasive evidence on the diﬀerent
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2. For example, see Rubin and Weisberg (2003, p. 257).
3. See the G22 reports released in 1988: Report of the Working Group on Transparency and
Accountability, Report of the Working Group on Strengthening Financial Systems, and Report
of the Working Group on International Financial Crises.eﬀects of capital controls and capital account liberalization. The studies
cover a variety of countries and periods, use a range of approaches and
methodologies, and build on several diﬀerent literatures. By focusing on in-
dividual experiences and/or speciﬁc eﬀects of capital controls, this micro-
economic approach can yield more concrete and robust evidence than
thecross-country macroeconomic studies that assume that capital controls
have similar eﬀects across countries and periods. Granted, this microeco-
nomic approach has the disadvantage that it is diﬃcult to generalize from
individual countries’ experiences. It also has the disadvantage that it is
diﬃcult to aggregate the diﬀerent microeconomic results to capture the
macroeconomic eﬀects of capital controls. Nonetheless, this new series of
microeconomic studies provides compelling and robust evidence of the
pervasive eﬀects of capital controls.
This paper surveys these diverse microeconomic studies and attempts to
develop a more coherent picture of the microeconomic evidence on capital
controls. Several key themes emerge. First, capital controls tend to reduce
the supply of capital, raise the cost of ﬁnancing, and increase ﬁnancial con-
straints—especially for smaller ﬁrms and ﬁrms without access to interna-
tional capital markets. Second, capital controls can reduce market disci-
pline in ﬁnancial markets and the government, leading to a more ineﬃcient
allocation of capital and resources. Third, capital controls signiﬁcantly
distort decision making by ﬁrms and individuals as they attempt to mini-
mize the costs of the controls or even evade them outright. Fourth, the
eﬀects of capital controls can vary across diﬀerent types of ﬁrms and coun-
tries, reﬂecting diﬀerent preexisting economic distortions. Finally, capital
controls can be diﬃcult and costly to enforce, even in countries with sound
institutions and low levels of corruption.
Although this literature examining the microeconomic eﬀects of capital
controls is only in its infancy and much more careful analysis remains to be
done, the combination of results is compelling. These papers use diverse
methodologies to examine very diﬀerent aspects of capital controls in a
range of countries and time periods, yet most ﬁnd a consistent result: cap-
ital controls have pervasive eﬀects, yield many unexpected costs, and can
distort the allocation of resources, all of which can hinder market eﬃ-
ciency. Granted, capital controls may also have some costs and beneﬁts
that are not addressed in these microeconomic papers—such as reducing
a country’s vulnerability to currency crises.4 Moreover, in the presence of
existing market distortions, capital controls can be a second-best policy.5
Therefore, this survey is not, in any way, a full cost-beneﬁt analysis of cap-
ital controls. Countries evaluating whether to impose capital controls or
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4. See Block and Forbes (2004) for an evaluation of the various costs and beneﬁts of capi-
tal controls.
5. For example, if capital market ineﬃciencies allow companies to overborrow, capital con-
trols that limit the supply of loans may minimize the initial distortion.liberalize their capital accounts need to consider factors other than this
microeconomic evidence. The results in this paper do clearly suggest,
however, that capital controls (including taxes on capital inﬂows) create
substantial microeconomic distortions. The recent sea change in views
supporting capital controls (bolstered by the inconclusive macroeconomic
evidence) appears to be premature. The microeconomic evidence on capi-
tal controls presents a clear picture: capital controls have pervasive eﬀects
and can generate substantial, unexpected costs. Capital controls are no
free lunch.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 discusses
reasons why the macroeconomic evidence on capital controls has been in-
conclusive to date. Section 4.3 surveys the microeconomic evidence on how
capital controls aﬀect the supply and cost of capital. Section 4.4 reviews the
evidence on how controls aﬀect market discipline and the allocation of
capital. Section 4.5 describes how controls can aﬀect the behavior and ac-
tions of ﬁrms and individuals. Section 4.6 brieﬂy discusses the challenges
to implementing and enforcing capital controls. Section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 Inconclusive Macroeconomic Evidence on Capital Controls
The macroeconomic literature has had limited empirical success to date
in providing robust evidence on the beneﬁts of capital account liberaliza-
tion.6 Most papers in this literature use a variant of the standard cross-
country growth regression developed by Robert Barro to test if the pres-
ence of capital controls or capital account liberalization is correlated with
higher economic growth. Prasad et al. (2003) provide a detailed survey of
this literature and argue that the results are inconclusive. More speciﬁcally,
of the fourteen recent papers they examine, three ﬁnd a positive eﬀect of
ﬁnancial integration on growth, four ﬁnd no eﬀect, and seven ﬁnd mixed
results. The only consistency in the papers surveyed is that none ﬁnd
evidence that capital account liberalization signiﬁcantly reduces growth.
Prasad et al. (2003) also perform their own analysis, whose key result is
replicated in ﬁgure 4.1. They ﬁnd no signiﬁcant relationship between ﬁ-
nancial openness and growth in real per capita income across countries—
even after controlling for standard variables in this literature.7
There are several possible explanations for these conﬂicting results and
the lack of consensus in the macroeconomic literature.8 First, it is ex-
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6. For excellent surveys of this literature, see Edison et al. (2002), Eichengreen (2001), or
Prasad et al. (2003).
7. The control variables include initial income, initial schooling, average investment/gross
domestic product (GDP), political instability, and regional dummies.
8. For a more thorough discussion of these challenges, see Eichengreen (2003, chap. 3),
Prasad et al. (2003), or Magud and Reinhart (2004).tremely diﬃcult to accurately measure capital account openness.9 Many
studies use rough numerical indexes of diﬀerent policies and regulations,
but even the more carefully constructed measures cannot capture the com-
plexity and eﬀectiveness of a country’s liberalization. Due to these prob-
lems, other studies have used de facto measures of integration (such as cap-
ital ﬂows or foreign asset holdings). These are also problematic, since some
countries with large capital inﬂows still maintain relatively strict capital
controls (such as China), while other countries with relatively unrestricted
capital accounts receive little foreign capital (such as many African na-
tions). Still other studies have examined market comovement to measure
integration with international markets, but these studies face the challenge
of controlling for other factors that could cause markets to comove—such
as global shocks or similar asset structures. A ﬁnal approach has been to
study onshore-oﬀshore interest rate diﬀerentials. This approach is also
problematic since not only are these diﬀerentials only available for a lim-
ited set of countries, but also interest rate diﬀerentials could move due to a
number of factors other than capital account liberalization.
Second, diﬀerent types of capital ﬂows and capital controls may have
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Fig. 4.1 Conditional relationship between ﬁnancial openness and growth
Source: Prasad et al. (2003).
Notes: Growth is measured by growth in real per capita GDP. Conditioning variables are ini-
tial income, initial schooling, average investment/GDP, political instability, and regional
dummies.
9. See Edison et al. (2002) for an excellent discussion of diﬀerent measures of capital ac-
count openness.diﬀerent eﬀects on growth and other macroeconomic variables. For ex-
ample, recent work suggests that the beneﬁts of foreign direct investment
(FDI) may be greater than those of other types of capital ﬂows. Reisen and
Soto (2001) examine the impact of six diﬀerent types of capital ﬂows on
growth and ﬁnd that only two—FDI and portfolio equity ﬂows—are pos-
itively associated with growth. Henry and Lorentzen (2003) argue that eq-
uity market liberalizations are more likely to promote growth than debt
market liberalizations. Other papers argue that controls on capital inﬂows
may be less harmful than controls on capital outﬂows, because controls on
inﬂows may be viewed as a form of prudential regulation, while controls on
outﬂows may be viewed as a lack of government commitment to sound
policies. For example, Rossi (1999) ﬁnds that controls on capital inﬂows
reduce the risk of a currency crisis, while controls on capital outﬂows
heighten the risk. Moreover, even the sequence in which diﬀerent types of
capital controls are removed may determine the aggregate impact. For ex-
ample, lifting restrictions on oﬀshore bank borrowing before freeing other
sectors of the capital account may increase the vulnerability of a country’s
banking system (as seen in Korea in the mid-1990s).
Finally, the impact of removing capital controls could depend on a range
of other, hard-to-measure factors that are diﬃcult to capture in simple
cross-country regressions, such as a country’s institutions or corporate
governance. For example, Chinn and Ito (2002) show that ﬁnancial sys-
tems with a higher degree of legal and institutional development beneﬁt
more, on average, from liberalization.10 Gelos and Wei (2002) show that
countries with greater transparency are not only more likely to attract in-
ternational equity investment but less vulnerable to herding and capital
ﬂight during crises. A closely related factor is that there may be “threshold
eﬀects” that are diﬃcult to capture in linear regressions. More speciﬁcally,
countries may need to attain a certain level of ﬁnancial market integration
or overall economic development before attaining substantial beneﬁts
from lifting capital controls. For example, Klein and Olivei (1999) ﬁnd that
capital account openness only stimulates ﬁnancial development in Orga-
nization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries.
Moreover, most countries that remove their capital controls simulta-
neously undertake a range of additional reforms and undergo widespread
structural changes. Therefore, it can be extremely diﬃcult to isolate the
speciﬁc impact of removing capital controls during these transition pe-
riods.
Given all of these challenges to measuring the impact of capital controls,
it is not surprising that the empirical literature has had diﬃculty docu-
menting the eﬀect of capital controls on growth at the macroeconomic
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10. Aghion, Bacchetta, and Banerjee (2001) develop a theoretical model of why ﬁnancial
development is a key variable determining the impact of capital account liberalization.level. Moreover, to put these challenges in perspective, the current status of
this literature is similar to the earlier literature on how trade liberalization
aﬀects growth. Economists generally believe that trade openness raises
economic growth, but most of the initial work on this topic (which used the
same cross-country framework as these studies of capital account open-
ness) also reached inconclusive results. In some cases trade liberalization
appeared to have a positive correlation with economic growth, but in most
cases these results were not robust to sensitivity testing. Stanley Fischer
(2003) recently made this point: “With regard to empirical evidence on the
beneﬁts of capital account liberalization, I believe we are roughly now
where we were in the 1980s on current account liberalization—that some
evidence is coming in, but that it is at this stage weak and disputed” (p. 14).
Since accurately measuring capital account liberalization and its interac-
tions with other key variables may be even more diﬃcult than for trade lib-
eralization, it is not surprising that the initial work in this area has gener-
ated mixed results to date.
Although the macroeconomic empirical evidence on how trade open-
ness aﬀects growth took years to develop, at a much earlier date several pa-
pers using microeconomic data and case studies found compelling evi-
dence that trade liberalization raises productivity and growth. Similarly,
recent work using microeconomic and case study evidence has been much
more successful than the macroeconomic literature in documenting the
costs of capital controls. Although case studies have shortcomings, such as
the diﬃculty of controlling for other simultaneous events and generalizing
to diﬀerent countries and experiences, this microeconomic approach can
avoid many of the problems with the macroeconomic, cross-country liter-
ature. Moreover, this microeconomic approach can facilitate a much more
detailed measurement of exactly how capital account liberalization aﬀects
the allocation of resources and market eﬃciency.
4.3 Capital Controls and the Supply and Cost of Capital
Lifting capital controls should allow capital to ﬂow where it can earn the
highest expected rate of return. Since capital is relatively scarce in low-
income, labor-intensive economies, the return to capital would be expected
to be higher, on average, than in capital-abundant, wealthy countries.
Therefore, standard economic theory suggests that when emerging mar-
kets lift their capital controls, capital should tend to ﬂow in from wealthier
countries. Capital inﬂows could generate substantial beneﬁts, such as pro-
viding capital for investment, making advanced technology available, and
spurring competitiveness.
This simple prediction, however, does not hold for many countries. Most
capital currently ﬂows from developing to developed countries or between
developed countries—not from developed to developing countries. Figure
The Microeconomic Evidence on Capital Controls 1774.2shows that emerging markets have been net exporters of capital, instead
of net importers, since 2000. Even before 2000 when emerging markets
were net capital importers, their volume of capital inﬂows was much lower
than might be expected given their relative scarcity of capital. One reason
why capital inﬂows to developing countries may be so low is the greater
prevalence of capital controls in these markets. Some low- and middle-
income countries that have lifted their capital controls, however, still expe-
rience net capital outﬂows.
There are a number of reasons why capital might ﬂow from capital-
scarce to capital-rich countries, even in the absence of capital controls.
First, the enforceability of property rights is weak in most developing
countries. Second, informal administrative barriers (such as corruption,
the absence of transparent rules for investment, and the scarcity of trained,
professional civil servants) can discourage foreign investment in develop-
ing countries. Third, lower levels of human capital in developing countries
can reduce productivity.11 Finally, many developing countries have a his-
tory of default and substantially higher credit risk (Reinhart and Rogoﬀ
2004). All of these factors can reduce the expected return to capital in de-
veloping countries, despite their relative scarcity of capital. For all of these
reasons, if emerging markets lift their capital controls, capital could actu-
ally ﬂow out of, instead of into, the country. As a result, it is diﬃcult to pre-
dict, a priori, how lifting capital controls will aﬀect the supply of capital in
a country.
Moreover, lifting capital controls can aﬀect the cost of capital not only
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Fig. 4.2 Net capital ﬂows to emerging markets
Source: IMF Global Financial Stability Report.
Note: Emerging market countries are those included in the EMBI and/or EMBI .
11. See Lucas (1990).by aﬀecting the supply of capital but also by allowing investors to expand
their portfolio of asset holdings to better diversify risk. Since asset returns
in an individual country are not perfectly correlated with global asset re-
turns (or returns in any other individual country), removing capital con-
trols can facilitate international risk sharing. A greater diversiﬁcation of
risk will reduce the volatility of expected portfolio returns, thereby reduc-
ing the cost of capital.12
4.3.1 The Cross-Country Evidence
Several microeconomic studies address these issues by assessing how
lifting capital controls aﬀects equity markets, the cost of capital, and ﬁ-
nancial constraints for diﬀerent types of ﬁrms. Chari and Henry (2004b)
examine the impact of removing controls on stock market investment on
diﬀerent types of ﬁrms in eleven emerging markets. They ﬁnd that when
publicly listed ﬁrms become eligible for foreign ownership, they experience
an average stock price revaluation of 15.1 percent and a signiﬁcant fall in
their average cost of capital (with the risk-free rate of return falling be-
tween 5.9 percent and 9.1 percent, depending on the speciﬁcation).13 The
impact on the expected returns of individual ﬁrms is directly proportional
to the ﬁrm-speciﬁc changes in systematic risk resulting from the liberaliza-
tion. These aﬀects are also greater for stocks that become “investible” (i.e.,
that can be purchased by foreigners after liberalization) as compared to
ﬁrms that are “noninvestible” (i.e., that remain oﬀ-limits for foreign in-
vestment). These results suggest that the supply of capital increases and the
cost of capital decreases after capital controls on equity investment are re-
moved, although the eﬀects will vary across diﬀerent types of ﬁrms.
A number of studies assess the impact of removing capital controls on the
supply and cost of capital by using a diﬀerent approach—measuring how
capital controls aﬀect the ﬁnancing constraints of diﬀerent types of com-
panies. Financing constraints are generally measured as the sensitivity of
investment to cash ﬂow, while controlling for a number of ﬁrm-level vari-
ables (including investment opportunities). Harrison, Love, and McMillan
(2004) follow this approach and use an extensive cross-country, time-series,
ﬁrm-level data set.14 Their study ﬁnds that restrictions on capital account
transactions tend to increase ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing constraints. These ﬁnancial
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12. See Bekaert and Harvey (2003) for a formal model and more detailed discussion of this
eﬀect.
13. These results are supported by several macroeconomic studies of how liberalizations
aﬀect equity markets. For example, Henry (2000) shows that the mean growth rate of private
investment increases by about 22 percentage points over the three years after liberalizations
in emerging markets. Bekaert and Harvey (2000) show that the cost of capital decreases by
between 5 and 75 basis points after liberalizations.
14. Capital controls are measured using diﬀerent dummy variables for the ﬁve categories of
capital controls in the IMF’s Trade and Exchange Restrictions. This measure of capital con-
trols is imprecise, and its problems are discussed in the literature surveyed in section 4.2.constraints are greater for ﬁrms that are domestically owned (as compared
to those with either foreign ownership or assets), which the authors inter-
pret as being “consistent with the hypothesis that foreign investment is as-
sociated with a greater reduction in the credit constraints of ﬁrms which are
less likely to have access to international capital markets” (Harrison, Love,
and McMillan 2004, p. 272). Restrictions on capital ﬂows other than capi-
tal account transactions—such as on import surcharges or surrender re-
quirements for exporters—have no impact on ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial constraints.
The study also ﬁnds that increased FDI is associated with reduced ﬁrm ﬁ-
nancing constraints—although a number of factors other than lifting con-
trols on capital inﬂows will determine FDI ﬂows.
Several studies use broader measures of liberalization and also ﬁnd that
greater liberalization decreases ﬁnancial constraints in a panel of ﬁrms and
countries. One of the most common measures of liberalization is ﬁnancial
liberalization—which generally includes lifting controls on foreign invest-
ment in the ﬁnancial sector, as well as lifting controls on interest rates and
reducing directed-credit programs. For example, Laeven (2003) constructs
a new measure of banking-sector liberalization that includes several fac-
tors in addition to removing barriers to bank entry by foreign investors.
Using this measure, Laeven’s study ﬁnds that ﬁnancial liberalization sig-
niﬁcantly reduces ﬁnancing constraints for small ﬁrms, with an 80 percent
average reduction in the sensitivity of investment to cash ﬂow. Laeven
(2003) also ﬁnds that large ﬁrms tend to be less ﬁnancially constrained be-
fore liberalization and are less likely to experience a reduction in ﬁnancial
constraints afterward. There is even some evidence that large ﬁrms may ex-
perience an increase in ﬁnancial constraints after bank liberalizations. The
study suggests this may reﬂect that “in many developing countries, large
ﬁrms had access to preferential (directed) credit during the period before
ﬁnancial liberalization. This form of favoritism is likely to decrease during
ﬁnancial liberalization” (Laeven 2003, p. 25).
Other papers expand beyond the banking sector and use even broader
measures of ﬁnancial liberalization to examine the microeconomic impact
on ﬁrm ﬁnancing constraints.15 For example, Love (2003) uses an index of
ﬁnancial development that includes market capitalization, value traded,
and the share of credit going to the private sector. Although this study does
not explicitly test the relationship between this measure of ﬁnancial devel-
opment and capital account liberalization, other work shows that capital
account liberalization tends to signiﬁcantly increase ﬁnancial market de-
velopment.16 Love (2003) ﬁnds a strong negative relationship between ﬁ-
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15. In a closely related study, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) show that ﬁrms in
countries with a more active stock market and large banking sector grow faster than they
could using only internally generated funds.
16. For example, see Klein and Olivei (1999). Also see Bekaert and Harvey (2003) for an ex-
cellent survey of this literature.nancial market development and ﬁnancing constraints for all types of
ﬁrms. Her study also ﬁnds that smaller ﬁrms have signiﬁcantly greater ﬁ-
nancial constraints than larger ﬁrms in less ﬁnancially developed coun-
tries.
4.3.2 Evidence from Individual Countries
This series of studies using a range of diﬀerent statistics to measure cap-
ital account liberalization and its impact on ﬁrm ﬁnancing constraints has
utilized cross-country, ﬁrm-level data. Although cross-country data have
the obvious advantage of being able to test for common relationships
across diﬀerent countries, they have the disadvantage of aggregating across
very diﬀerent liberalization experiences and relying on more limited data
that are only available across countries. In order to avoid these problems,
several studies have focused on individual countries’ experiences with cap-
ital account liberalization and ﬁrm ﬁnancing constraints.
One country that has received substantial attention is Chile. Chile en-
acted taxes on capital inﬂows (the encaje) from 1991 to 1998. This experi-
ence is useful for case studies not only because it is generally cited as one
of the most successful examples of capital controls, but also since the en-
actment and then removal of the tax provides a useful time-series dimen-
sion to assess its impact.17 Forbes (2003) examines how the encaje aﬀected
investment and ﬁnancial constraints for diﬀerent types of publicly traded
ﬁrms in Chile. Figure 4.3, which is replicated from the paper, shows that in-
The Microeconomic Evidence on Capital Controls 181
17. See Forbes (2003) for more information on the encaje and the literature assessing the
impact of these capital controls.
Fig. 4.3 Growth in investment-capital ratios for Chilean ﬁrms
Source: Forbes (2003).vestment growth was higher for smaller, publicly traded ﬁrms than larger
ﬁrms both before and after the encaje (which is a standard result in the ﬁ-
nance literature). During the period that the capital controls were in place,
however, investment growth plummeted for smaller companies and was
generally lower than for larger companies. A more formal empirical anal-
ysis in the study that controls for a range of variables conﬁrms these results
and indicates that the encaje signiﬁcantly increased ﬁnancial constraints
for smaller, publicly traded companies, but not for larger ﬁrms.
Gallego and Hernández (2003) use a diﬀerent estimation technique to
examine the impact of capital controls in Chile, but they ﬁnd similar re-
sults. Their study shows that the encaje signiﬁcantly increased the cost of
external funding for Chilean ﬁrms, although the average eﬀect was small in
magnitude. These eﬀects also vary substantially across diﬀerent types of
ﬁrms. For example, the impact of the encaje on ﬁnancing costs for smaller
ﬁrms was about 60 basis points higher than for ﬁrms that could issue secu-
rities abroad. Gallego and Hernández (2003) also examine the impact of
lifting restrictions on capital outﬂows in Chile. In contrast to the eﬀect of
the encaje,lifting controls on capital outﬂows increases the cost of funding
for all types of ﬁrms, although the magnitude of the eﬀect is small. The pa-
per states that controlling capital outﬂows by “keeping national savings
‘captive’ in the local market may have resulted in an artiﬁcially lower cost
of borrowing for ﬁrms” (Gallego and Hernández 2003, p. 243).
Although most other countries do not provide as clear a natural experi-
ment to test the impact of capital account liberalization as the Chilean
encaje, other studies have focused on how broader measures of ﬁnancial
liberalization aﬀect ﬁrm ﬁnancing constraints. For example, Gelos and
Werner (2001) examine the impact of widespread ﬁnancial market liberal-
ization in Mexico in the late 1980s on ﬁxed investment in Mexican manu-
facturing ﬁrms.18 Their study ﬁnds that after ﬁnancial market liberaliza-
tion, ﬁnancial constraints were signiﬁcantly eased for smaller companies,
although not larger companies. Liberalization may not have reduced ﬁ-
nancial constraints for larger companies, for two reasons. First, larger
companies had much lower ﬁnancial constraints before liberalization. Sec-
ond, larger companies were more likely to have stronger political connec-
tions that provided better access to directed credit at preferential rates be-
fore liberalization.
Other studies examine the impact of broader ﬁnancial market liberal-
izations in other Latin American countries. Gallego and Loayza (2000) fo-
cus on Chilean ﬁrms between 1985 and 1995 and ﬁnd that ﬁrms were ﬁ-
nancially constrained before liberalization (during the period from 1985 to
1990), and these constraints were signiﬁcantly reduced after liberalization
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18. This study uses an innovative approach to address a censoring problem in investment
data by using real estate as collateral.(from 1991 to 1996). The paper does not test for the impact of the encaje
(which was enacted midway through the later period) or diﬀerentiate be-
tween large and small ﬁrms.19 Jaramillo, Schiantarelli, and Weiss (1996)
focus on Ecuadorian ﬁrms in the 1980s and ﬁnd that capital market im-
perfections caused smaller and younger ﬁrms to be more ﬁnancially
constrained than older ﬁrms. Financial constraints do not fall signiﬁcantly
after liberalization (even for small ﬁrms), but the authors admit that since
ﬁnancial reform was an ongoing process, it is diﬃcult to clearly identify the
pre- and postreform episodes. They also admit that this time-series anal-
ysis is complicated by several macroeconomic events during this period, in-
cluding severe inﬂation in 1988, a major earthquake, loose ﬁscal policy,
and a sharp reduction in credit provided by the central bank.
A ﬁnal country study of the impact of ﬁnancial market liberalization on
ﬁnancial constraints is Harris, Schiantarelli, and Siregar (1994). This study
examines Indonesian manufacturing establishments and suﬀers from sim-
ilar time series identiﬁcation problems as Jaramillo, Schiantarelli, and
Weiss (1996). With this caveat, the study ﬁnds that liberalization improves
access to ﬁnancing for all types of ﬁrms, but may increase borrowing costs,
especially for smaller ﬁrms. The study suggests that the movement from
preferential credit to lending based on market mechanisms can increase
the overall availability of ﬁnancing, but it may simultaneously raise the
cost of capital for individual ﬁrms that previously beneﬁted from prefer-
ential access to credit.
4.3.3 Summary
This series of cross-country and individual case studies on the impact of
capital controls, capital account liberalization, and broader ﬁnancial mar-
ket liberalization on the supply and cost of capital has several key themes.
First, liberalization tends to reduce the cost of capital and ameliorate ﬁ-
nancial constraints, on average, two eﬀects that are consistent with liberal-
ization’s increasing the supply of capital. Second, smaller ﬁrms and com-
panies that did not previously have access to international capital markets
are more likely to experience these beneﬁts of liberalizations. Third, certain
types of ﬁrms in several countries may have beneﬁted from capital controls
and more restricted ﬁnancial markets, possibly through preferential lend-
ing agreements. These companies were less likely to beneﬁt from reduced
ﬁnancial constraints after liberalizations, and may even face a higher cost
of capital. This set of microeconomic results clearly suggests that capital
controls can reduce the supply and increase the price of capital, making it
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19. Gallego and Loayza (2000) ﬁnd evidence, however, that ﬁrms eligible for investment in
pension funds (pension fund management company [PFMC]–grade ﬁrms) were less ﬁnan-
cially constrained than non PFMC-grade ﬁrms before 1990. Since PFMC-grade ﬁrms tend to
be larger than the average Chilean ﬁrm, this is consistent with the hypothesis that smaller
ﬁrms were more ﬁnancially constrained than larger ﬁrms during this period.more diﬃcult for many ﬁrms to obtain ﬁnancing for productive invest-
ment. Although experiences vary across countries, these eﬀects are gener-
ally greatest for smaller ﬁrms, ﬁrms in less distorted ﬁnancial markets, and
ﬁrms without access to international capital markets or preferential lend-
ing arrangements. This impact of capital controls on small ﬁrms could be
particularly important for emerging markets in which small and new ﬁrms
are often important sources of job creation and economic growth.
4.4 Capital Controls and Market Discipline
Capital controls can not only reduce the supply and increase the cost of
capital, but they can insulate an economy from competitive forces, reduc-
ing market discipline and allowing capital to be allocated ineﬃciently.
Some of the results discussed in the last section were consistent with this
eﬀect—although none of the studies tested it explicitly. An additional se-
ries of microeconomic papers, however, tests whether capital controls
aﬀect market discipline through three closely related channels: through the
eﬃciency with which capital is allocated, through the government’s ability
to channel resources ineﬃciently, and through the information content in
asset prices.
4.4.1 Capital Controls and the Allocation of Capital
Chari and Henry’s study (2004a) is the most careful study directly test-
ing for the impact of capital controls on the allocation of capital. This
study examines how stock market liberalizations in emerging markets
aﬀect investment and the return to capital for diﬀerent types of ﬁrms. It
ﬁnds that ﬁrms with better fundamentals before liberalization have a
greater increase in capital investment after liberalization. Moreover, this
eﬀect of ﬁrm characteristics on the allocation of investment can outweigh
the average eﬀects on all equities from liberalization. For example, the pa-
per’s baseline estimates show that a 1 percentage point increase in a ﬁrm’s
expected future cash ﬂow (indicating stronger fundamentals) predicts a 4.1
percentage point increase in its investment ratio after liberalization. In
comparison, the country-speciﬁc impact of liberalization on the cost of
capital predicts only a 2.3 percentage point increase in investment. The
authors conclude that stock market liberalizations do “not constitute a
wasteful binge” and that the “invisible hand” is “discerning” in its ability
to allocate capital to ﬁrms with higher expected returns after liberaliza-
tions.
A number of studies focus on how liberalizations in areas other than
equity markets aﬀect the allocation of investment across ﬁrms. Galindo,
Schiantarelli, and Weiss (2006) assess if banking-sector liberalizations
(which include reducing barriers to foreign investment as well as other re-
forms) improve the eﬃciency with which investment is allocated in twelve
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capital using an index measuring whether investment funds go to ﬁrms
with a higher marginal return to capital. The return to capital is measured
using panel estimates of a Cobb-Douglas production function. Results
show that liberalizations increase the eﬃciency of the allocation of invest-
ment in the majority of emerging markets in their sample. Jaramillo, Schi-
antarelli, and Weiss (1992) focus on a broader deﬁnition of ﬁnancial mar-
ket liberalization (including the banking sector as well as other ﬁnancial
markets) and only include ﬁrms in Ecuador during its period of liberaliza-
tion in the 1980s. They also ﬁnd that liberalization increases credit ﬂows to
more “technically eﬃcient” ﬁrms, although the time series framework in
this study has several problems (as discussed in section 4.3.2).
Several microeconomic studies have also tested for a relationship be-
tween the allocation of capital and overall ﬁnancial development, as mea-
sured by the size of a country’s equity and credit markets relative to GDP.
This measure has a positive relationship to capital controls, although an
even weaker one than measures of ﬁnancial market liberalizations (as dis-
cussed above). Nonetheless, the results from these studies are consistent
with the results on how capital controls aﬀect the allocation of capital. For
example, Wurgler (2000) uses industry-level data to show that investment
growth is more closely associated with the growth in value added (a mea-
sure of the return to capital) in countries with more developed ﬁnancial
systems. Rajan and Zingales (1998) show that industries that are more re-
liant on external ﬁnancing grow faster in more ﬁnancially developed coun-
tries, suggesting that ﬁnancial development reduces ﬁrms’ costs of external
ﬁnance.20 These results suggest that capital is allocated more eﬃciently in
countries with more developed or deeper ﬁnancial markets.
Abiad, Oomes, and Ueda (2004) also examine the relationship between
ﬁnancial markets and the allocation of capital, but they explicitly test for
diﬀerences in the relative importance of ﬁnancial liberalization (the focus
of the papers at the beginning of this section) and of overall ﬁnancial de-
velopment (the focus of the papers in the previous paragraph). The Abiad
et al. study also develops a new method for measuring the eﬃciency of the
allocation of capital. More speciﬁcally, it uses the dispersion in Tobin’s qin
a given country and year (after controlling for other factors) to proxy for
the variation in expected returns. A lower variation in returns is interpreted
as indicating that capital is allocated more eﬃciently, because if a country
removes its capital controls, then credit should be reallocated from ﬁrms
with lower expected returns to ﬁrms with higher expected returns, thereby
raising expected returns for the former group and reducing them for the
latter. The study ﬁnds that ﬁnancial liberalization (which includes entry
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20. Reliance on external ﬁnancing is measured by the industries’ reliance on external ﬁ-
nancing in the United States.barriers for banks, restrictions on international ﬁnancial transactions,
credit and interest rate controls, privatization, and other regulations) im-
proves the allocation of credit across ﬁrms. In contrast, ﬁnancial deepen-
ing (which is measured by the volume of credit being intermediated in ﬁ-
nancial markets) aﬀects ﬁrms’ access to ﬁnance but is a less important
determinant of the allocation of capital.
4.4.2 Capital Controls and Government’s Allocation of Resources
In developed countries, the allocation of capital and investment is largely
determined by ﬁnancial markets. In emerging markets and developing
countries, however, the government often plays a more important role.
Moreover, capital controls can insulate governments from market disci-
pline, giving government agencies greater freedom to allocate capital based
on factors other than the expected returns to investment. Therefore, instead
of testing for the general impact of capital account liberalization on the al-
location of a capital, an alternate approach is to test whether liberalization
aﬀects the government’s ability to allocate capital to preferred companies.
One paper that uses this approach is Johnson and Mitton (2002). This
study examines how the Asian crisis and the announcement of Malaysia’s
capital controls aﬀected stock returns for individual Malaysian compa-
nies. It splits the sample into ﬁrms with political connections to senior gov-
ernment oﬃcials (such as Prime Minister Mahathir) and those without po-
litical connections. The paper ﬁnds that in the initial phase of the crisis
(before the capital controls were enacted), politically connected ﬁrms ex-
perienced a greater loss in market value than ﬁrms without political con-
nections. When the controls were put into place, politically connected
ﬁrms experienced a relatively greater increase in market value. These re-
sults suggest that the Asian crisis initially increased ﬁnancial pressures on
Malaysian ﬁrms, improving market discipline and reducing the expected
ability of the government to provide subsidies for favored ﬁrms. When the
capital controls were put into place, however, investors expected that the
Malaysian government would have more freedom to help favored ﬁrms,
thereby reducing market discipline.
Moreover, the empirical estimates in Johnson and Mitton (2002) suggest
that this eﬀect of the Malaysian capital controls on expected market disci-
pline was substantial. In the initial phase of the crisis (from July 1997 to
August 1998), politically connected ﬁrms lost about $5.7 billion in market
value due to the fall in the expected value of their connections. When the
controls were enacted in September 1998 (and market values were sub-
stantially lower), politically connected ﬁrms gained about $1.3 billion in
market value due to the increased value of their connections. Another cal-
culation indicates that at the end of September 1998, after the capital con-
trols had reduced market discipline, political connections were worth
about 17 percent of the total market value for connected ﬁrms.
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Capital controls can also impact the allocation of capital by aﬀecting the
liquidity of asset markets and the eﬃciency of asset market pricing. Con-
trols on capital inﬂows can make it more diﬃcult for foreigners to invest in
domestic ﬁnancial markets, therefore reducing a valuable source of invest-
ment and liquidity. On the other hand, controls on capital outﬂows could
increase liquidity by keeping funds inside the country. Similarly, restric-
tions on domestic companies’ ability to raise ﬁnancing abroad could foster
the development and liquidity of domestic ﬁnancial markets. Controls on
either capital inﬂows or outﬂows, however, could reduce competitive pres-
sure and market discipline, thereby reducing the information content of as-
set prices. This eﬀect could be particularly important in less developed ﬁ-
nancial markets, where foreign investors can have greater experience
valuing assets and therefore provide more reliable pricing information.
Therefore, the impact of capital account liberalization on asset market liq-
uidity and pricing eﬃciency must be resolved empirically. This is an im-
portant issue not only in and of itself but also because stock market mis-
pricing can aﬀect a number of ﬁrm-level variables, such as the cost of debt,
total investment, FDI, and merger and acquisition activity.21
Li et al.’s (2004) study provides evidence on how capital account liberal-
ization could aﬀect the eﬃciency of asset pricing. This study examines the
extent to which individual stock prices move up and down together in
speciﬁc countries—what is also called “synchronicity.” High levels of co-
movement and low levels of ﬁrm-speciﬁc variation in prices suggest that
stock prices are less eﬃcient. In other words, when stock prices are driven
more by aggregate, country-level news instead of by ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables
and information, there is less market discipline. The Li et al. paper uses sev-
eral diﬀerent measures to show that greater openness in capital markets
(but not in goods markets) is correlated with greater ﬁrm-speciﬁc content
in stock prices. Therefore, greater openness in capital markets is associated
with more market discipline and more eﬃcient stock market pricing. This
relationship is magniﬁed in countries with strong institutions and good
governance.
One set of results in the working-paper version of the study by Li et al.
(2004) is particularly relevant to the previous discussion of the impact of
the Asian crisis and Malaysian capital controls on stock market prices.22
Around the time of the Asian crisis, the ﬁrm-speciﬁc variation in stock
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21. Diﬀerent studies in this literature ﬁnd diﬀerent eﬀects. See Baker, Foley, and Wurgler
(2004) for an overview.
22. These results were removed from the published version of the paper but are included
in the working-paper version prepared for the conference on Global Linkages held at the
IMF on January 30–31, 2003. The paper is available at http://web.mit.edu/kjforbes/www/
GL-Website/GL-Conference.htm.prices increased signiﬁcantly in most Asian countries and remained high
for an extended period. This pattern is graphed for Korea in ﬁgure 4.4, and
it is typical of most open economies in the region. In Malaysia, the ﬁrm-
speciﬁc component of stock prices also increased signiﬁcantly after the
Asian crisis, but it then fell sharply after capital controls were imposed (as
also shown in ﬁg. 4.4). Although not a deﬁnitive test, this comparison sup-
ports the claim that the Asian crisis increased market discipline and the
ﬁrm-speciﬁc content in stock prices, while the Malaysian capital controls
suppressed market discipline and reduced the eﬃciency of stock market
prices.
Several studies have focused on an even narrower aspect of the relation-
ship between capital controls and asset pricing by examining the impact of
ﬁrms’ “migrating” abroad (i.e., of cross-listing on foreign stock markets, is-
suing depositary receipts, or raising capital directly in international mar-
kets). Capital controls can limit—or even restrict entirely—the ability of
ﬁrms to access international capital markets through these channels. An
extensive literature evaluates the impact of migration on ﬁrms that access
international markets, as well as the corresponding impact on domestic
ﬁrms that do not migrate. Bekaert and Harvey (2003) include a summary
of this literature. Firms that access international capital markets generally
attain a lower cost of capital and greater trading liquidity. Levine and
Schmukler (2006), however, show that migration reduces the trading activ-
ity and liquidity of domestic ﬁrms that do not raise capital internationally.
Migration not only shifts some trading activity abroad; it also shifts trad-
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Fig. 4.4 Firm-speciﬁc variation in stock prices
Source: Based on data from Li et al. (2004).
Notes: Higher levels of ﬁrm-speciﬁc variation in stock prices indicate greater pricing eﬃ-
ciency.ing activity within the domestic market away from purely domestic ﬁrms to
the “migrated” ﬁrms.
4.4.4 Summary
This series of cross-country and case studies on the impact of capital
controls, capital account liberalization, and broader ﬁnancial market de-
velopment on market discipline and the allocation of capital provides sev-
eral insights. First, capital controls can reduce market discipline and insu-
late the economy from competitive forces. Second and closely related,
ﬁnancial development, and especially capital market liberalization, leads
to a more eﬃcient allocation of capital across ﬁrms. Third, these eﬀects of
capital controls work through a number of diﬀerent channels—including
eﬀects on stock market valuations, access to ﬁnancing, the government’s
ability to channel resources ineﬃciently, and the eﬃciency of stock market
pricing. Therefore, capital controls appear to have widespread eﬀects on
market discipline and the allocation of capital across ﬁrms, eﬀects that are
likely to reduce productivity and growth.
4.5 Capital Controls and the Behavior of Firms and Individuals
Capital controls can cause ﬁrms and individuals to alter their behavior
to minimize the costs created by the controls. This modiﬁcation in behav-
ior can result from the explicit tax imposed by the capital controls, as well
as from the impact of capital controls on the supply and allocation of cap-
ital. In some cases, this modiﬁcation of behavior can involve inaccurate or
dishonest reporting or accounting in order to evade the controls outright.
These types of attempts by ﬁrms and individuals to minimize the costs of
capital controls can create additional distortions in an economy.
4.5.1 Capital Controls and Firm Behavior
One careful study of how capital controls aﬀect ﬁrm behavior focuses on
U.S. multinationals. Desai, Foley, and Hines (2004) show that U.S. multi-
nationals adjust their trade patterns, proﬁts, and dividend repatriations in
order to evade capital controls in other countries. For example, their study
estimates that multinational aﬃliates are about 10 percent more likely to
remit dividends to parent companies in the presence of capital controls, and
that the distortions to proﬁtability from capital controls are comparable to
a 24 percent increase in the corporate tax rate. It also shows that the cost of
borrowing is higher in countries with capital controls, and when this eﬀect
is combined with the other steps multinationals take to evade the controls,
this reduces the size of foreign investment by multinationals by 13 percent
to 16 percent. Therefore, not only can capital controls create widespread
distortions in how foreign companies behave in countries with controls, but
they also reduce the total amount of FDI available to host countries.
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havior focuses on local ﬁrms instead of multinational aﬃliates. Schmukler
and Vesperoni (2001) use ﬁrm-level data from East Asia and Latin Amer-
ica for the 1980s and 1990s to examine how leverage ratios, debt maturity
structures, and ﬁnancing sources change when countries increase their in-
tegration with international equity and bond markets and undergo ﬁnan-
cial liberalization. The study ﬁnds that, on average, debt maturity tends to
shorten but debt-equity ratios do not increase. It also ﬁnds that domestic
ﬁrms that participate in international markets obtain better ﬁnancing op-
portunities and extend their debt maturities. Also, ﬁrms in economies with
more developed domestic ﬁnancial systems are less aﬀected by liberaliza-
tion. These results suggest that some, although not all, ﬁrms may have ex-
panded ﬁnancing opportunities when countries lift their capital controls
and increase their integration with global ﬁnancial markets.
Instead of focusing on a cross section of countries, several studies exam-
ine how capital controls aﬀect ﬁrm behavior in an individual country.
Forbes (2003) shows that the encaje(the Chilean tax on capital inﬂows dis-
cussed in section 4.3) caused companies to adjust their ﬁnancial structure
in a number of ways. For example, immediately after the encaje was en-
acted, there was a sharp increase in the number of ﬁrms choosing to issue
stock that could then be cross-listed in the United States as American De-
positary Receipts (ADRs). Individuals trading stock listed as secondary
ADRs could avoid paying the encaje. In 1995, however, the Chilean gov-
ernment closed this loophole and included ADRs under the encaje. The
number of Chilean ﬁrms issuing stock plummeted. Figure 4.5 shows these
distortions to Chilean stock listings created by the encajeand changes in its
coverage. Cifuentes, Desormeaux, and González (2002) also discuss how
changes in this ADR loophole aﬀected the evolution of the Chilean stock
market. Their paper argues that the extension of the encaje to include sec-
ondary ADRs signiﬁcantly reduced ﬁnancial liquidity, transactions, and
investment in the domestic stock market—a reduction that persisted even
after the encaje was lifted.
Gallego and Hernández (2003) perform an even more detailed empirical
analysis of how the encajeaﬀected the ﬁnancial decisions of Chilean ﬁrms.
Their study ﬁnds that the encaje caused ﬁrms to reduce their leverage ra-
tios and paid capital, and increase their reliance on retained earnings. This
suggests that the capital controls raised the cost of borrowing and of issu-
ing equity, although the average magnitudes of these eﬀects were fairly
small. The study also ﬁnds that the encaje shortened the maturity of debt,
while reducing the relative importance of short-term ﬁnancial debt, indi-
cating that ﬁrms shifted to other sources of short-term funding to avoid the
tax (such as delaying tax payments and obtaining credit from suppliers).
Moreover, one fairly consistent ﬁnding throughout the study is that esti-
mates of the average eﬀects of the capital controls mask signiﬁcant diﬀer-
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impact of the encaje on ﬁrm ﬁnancing constraints). Firms that were larger,
belonged to a conglomerate, or were able to issue securities abroad were
more likely to respond to the capital controls by reducing their leverage
through increases in their capital base (instead of resorting to retained
earnings). Other ﬁrms, and especially smaller ﬁrms, were more likely to re-
spond to the capital controls by resorting to retained earnings for ﬁnanc-
ing and increasing their reliance on short-term debt.
Other than the cross-country and Chilean studies on how capital con-
trols aﬀect ﬁrm behavior, most other evidence relies on anecdotes instead
of formal empirical analysis. Several of these case studies, however, provide
more concise descriptions of exactly how companies adapt their behavior
in order to avoid capital controls. Many of these mechanisms are diﬃcult
to test empirically—but they could explain some of the more general
eﬀects discussed throughout this paper. One such study by Loungani and
Mauro (2001) focuses on Russia.23 This paper provides a detailed descrip-
tion of diﬀerent strategies followed by Russian ﬁrms to evade capital con-
trols. For example, in order to take money out of the country, ﬁrms would
overstate import payments, by means that included the use of fake import
contracts for goods and services. Companies would also create enterprises
with the sole purpose of presenting fake import contracts requiring ad-
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Fig. 4.5 Stock issuance/capital for Chilean ﬁrms
Source: Data from Forbes (2003).
23. Also see Tikhomirov (1997) for an excellent description of diﬀerent methods used to
evade capital controls in Russia.vance payments, and then the enterprises would be dissolved once the
funds had been transferred out of the country. Companies would also mis-
represent export earnings, by means such as under-invoicing exports or ex-
porting via an oﬀshore subsidiary with a low recorded transfer price (so
that the margin between the transfer and market prices could be deposited
oﬀshore). All Russian ﬁrms, however, were not equally adept at circum-
venting the controls, which contributed to uneven competitive conditions
and distorted the allocation of resources. The study presents evidence that
ﬁrms’ ability to evade the capital controls was widespread and that, as a
result, capital controls increased corruption and lowered economic eﬃ-
ciency in Russia.
4.5.2 Capital Controls and Individual Behavior
Individuals, as well as ﬁrms, can modify their behavior to minimize the
cost of capital controls—or even evade them outright. One compelling ex-
ample is how individuals responded to the “corralito” enacted by Argentina
at the end of 2001. The corralitorestricted capital outﬂows and withdrawals
from the banking system. During this period the stock market rose dramat-
ically, despite a sharp economic contraction, a plummeting peso, and a
banking system on the verge of collapse. Auguste et al. (2002) explain this
apparent discrepancy. Investors dodged the capital controls by purchasing
Argentine stocks for pesos, converting the stocks into ADRs, and then sell-
ing the ADRs in New York for dollars that could be deposited in U.S. bank
accounts. The study estimates that the capital outﬂow through this single
loophole was between $835 million and $3.4 billion in just the four months
starting in December 2001. Investors were willing to pay a substantial pre-
mium to evade the corralito—with some ADRs trading at a discount of over
40 percent. Once the conversion of Argentine shares into ADRs was pro-
hibited, the premium returned to nearly zero. Figure 4.6 (replicated from
the Auguste et al. paper) shows these trends for one Argentine stock. Melvin
(2003) also studies the same episode and reaches similar conclusions. The
surge in the ADR premium during the period of the corralito reﬂects what
investors were willing to pay to avoid the Argentine capital controls.
Several papers also describe how investors adjusted their behavior to
avoid capital controls in Russia. For example, Tikhomirov (1997) provides
a number of examples—including how Russian citizens would hold for-
eign currency funds in banks abroad so that they could invest and utilize
these resources more freely. Abalkin and Whalley (1999) discuss how Rus-
sian citizens would convert local currency holdings and bank deposits into
dollars, partially to facilitate evasion of the controls.
4.5.3 Summary
This series of microeconomic studies suggests that capital controls can
cause widespread distortions in the behavior of ﬁrms and individuals. U.S.
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tions to evade the controls. Domestic companies adjust their debt maturi-
ties and ﬁnancing structures when capital controls are lifted. Individuals are
willing to pay a substantial premium for a ﬁnancial transaction that allows
them to evade controls. Companies and individuals adopt numerous ac-
counting gimmicks—including creating temporary corporations—simply
to dodge the controls. These widespread distortions to ﬁrm and individual
behavior resulting from the capital controls are likely to be ineﬃcient.
4.6 The Enforcement of Capital Controls
Since ﬁrms and individuals will respond to capital controls by adjusting
their behavior, enforcing the controls and ensuring that they are eﬀective
can not only be a challenge but also involve substantial administrative
costs. Implementing capital controls is often a dynamic process. After a
system of controls is speciﬁed, ﬁrms and individuals often ﬁnd ways to
evade the controls, diminishing their eﬀectiveness over time. Governments
that do not wish to see the eﬀectiveness of the controls weakened will need
to constantly adopt new controls and regulations in order to close loop-
holes and respond to the adjustments in behavior that resulted from the
initial controls. Countries with weak institutions, especially a weak rule of
law and high levels of corruption, are even less likely to be able to imple-
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Fig. 4.6 Argentine and U.S. prices and premia for Perez Companc
Source: Auguste et al. (2002, ﬁg. 6).ment and enforce capital controls. Moreover, by providing an opportunity
for government oﬃcials to collect rents, capital controls can increase in-
centives for corruption and undermine institutions.
There is extensive anecdotal evidence from diﬀerent countries on the
diﬃculty faced by governments that attempt to enforce capital controls and
the link between capital controls and corruption. For example, Tikhomirov
(1997) provides a fairly detailed account of the attempts by the Russian gov-
ernment to limit illegal capital ﬂight. Despite the continual passing of new
rules and regulations in order to improve the government’s control over cap-
ital ﬂows, many of these rules were highly ineﬀective and capital ﬂight was
extensive. Diﬀerent sources suggest that capital ﬂight from Russia between
1990 and 1995 was somewhere in the very wide range of $35 billion to $400
billion. The study asserts that “instead of cutting proﬁts from the illegal
transfer of foreign currency funds abroad, these measures [the controls]
spread the corruption from the foreign trade sector to the bureaucracy and,
later, to the banking sector” (Tikhomirov 1997, p. 595). Russia’s challenges
in enforcing capital controls, however, could result partially from the weak
institutions in the country during the period of this study.
The Chilean experience with the encaje (discussed above) therefore pro-
vides a useful contrast. Chile has sound institutions, a strong rule of law,
and low levels of corruption. Despite these advantages, the government
was constantly modifying the encaje in order to close new loopholes that
were discovered by ﬁrms and investors. These changes included everything
from the types of inﬂows covered, to the currency with which to pay the
tax, to restrictions on rolling over maturing investments.24 Moreover, de-
spite Chile’s constant attempts to raise the amount of the tax, tighten the
capital controls, and close loopholes, there is some evidence that the eﬀec-
tiveness of the controls may still have declined over time.25 Central bank
data show that in 1992 the encaje covered about half of total gross capital
inﬂows, but in subsequent years coverage declined to only 24 percent of
inﬂows (Gallego, Hernández, and Schmidt-Hebbel 1999). Despite these
challenges of enforcing the capital controls, however, the Chilean govern-
ment still collected substantial revenues under the tax, which suggests that
it still maintained some degree of eﬀectiveness.26
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24. See Simone and Sorsa (1999) or Ariyoshi et al. (2000) for detailed information on this
evolution of capital account restrictions in Chile over the 1990s.
25. For example, Cowan and de Gregorio (1998) calculate the “power” of the controls and
argue that their power declined between 1995 and 1997 as evasion increased. Other studies,
however, argue that the power of the controls increased steadily over time until they were
removed in 1998. For example, see Gallego, Hernández, and Schmidt-Hebbel (1999) and
Valdés-Prieto and Soto (1998). Also see Simone and Sorsa (1999) for an overview of work on
the evasion of the encaje.
26. Gallego, Hernández, and Schmidt-Hebbel (1999) report that between June 1991 and
September 1998, the encaje increased central bank reserves by an average of 2 percent of
GDP, or 40 percent of the average capital account surplus.Moreover, as new ﬁnancial instruments continue to be developed and
investors and ﬁrms become more adept at transferring capital across
borders, it will become even more diﬃcult to enforce capital controls. The
recent case of Argentine investors using ADRs to evade the corralito
provides a clear example of this challenge. After studying this experience,
Auguste et al. (2002) suggest that once countries allow ﬁnancial market de-
velopment, “it may be diﬃcult if not impossible to reverse the process of
capital market integration with (even draconian) capital controls” (p. 4).
4.7 Conclusions
Although the cross-country macroeconomic evidence on how capital ac-
count liberalization aﬀects growth has yielded mixed results to date, a se-
ries of microeconomic papers provides far more persuasive evidence on the
diverse eﬀects of capital controls and capital account liberalization. The
studies surveyed in this paper present compelling empirical evidence that
capital controls can aﬀect the supply and cost of capital, market discipline,
the allocation of resources, and the behavior of ﬁrms and individuals. Sev-
eral studies also ﬁnd that the eﬀects of capital account liberalization vary
across types of ﬁrms, reﬂecting diﬀerent preexisting distortions under cap-
ital controls. For example, although lifting capital controls tends to reduce
ﬁnancial constraints for most ﬁrms, it can have no eﬀect (or even increase
ﬁnancial constraints) for ﬁrms that received preferential treatment under
the controls or had already found ways to evade them.
This microeconomic research on the impact of capital controls, however,
is only in its infancy. Much more careful analysis is needed to better un-
derstand why capital account liberalization can have varied eﬀects in dif-
ferent countries, and especially on what variables determine the success of
liberalizations. For example, what are the microeconomic consequences of
diﬀerent sequencing when lifting capital controls? What are the microeco-
nomic linkages between trade liberalizations and capital account liberal-
izations? How do diﬀerent institutions interact with the microeconomic
eﬀects of capital controls? And are the beneﬁts of capital account liberal-
ization usually level eﬀects or growth eﬀects?
Moreover, although this paper discusses how capital controls and ﬁnan-
cial liberalizations directly aﬀect a series of microeconomic variables, it
does not address a number of additional channels by which capital controls
could aﬀect key macroeconomic variables (such as exchange rates, the ﬁ-
nancial system, and/or monetary policy), which could, in turn, have addi-
tional eﬀects on ﬁrms and individuals. For example, controls on capital
outﬂows could reduce pressure on a currency to depreciate, and controls
on capital inﬂows could reduce pressure on a currency to appreciate. Con-
trols on capital outﬂows could help support a weak ﬁnancial system, while
controls on capital inﬂows could hinder the development of a deeper and
The Microeconomic Evidence on Capital Controls 195more eﬃcient ﬁnancial market. Controls on capital inﬂows and outﬂows
could create a wedge between domestic and foreign interest rates, thereby
providing a country with more ﬂexibility to follow an independent mone-
tary policy. Changes in exchange rates, the ﬁnancial system, and interest
rates will, in turn, aﬀect a range of microeconomic variables in the econ-
omy.27 The paper also does not make any attempt to address the political
economy of capital controls, such as what factors determine whether a
country is more likely to adopt controls or liberalize its capital account.28
Although this survey does not address a number of questions, largely
due to the limited microeconomic evidence that currently exists on these is-
sues, it does present a series of convincing results on the eﬀects of capital
controls and beneﬁts from capital account liberalizations. Although some
speciﬁc eﬀects vary across country experiences, capital controls generally
reduce the supply of capital, increase the price of capital, and increase ﬁ-
nancial constraints, especially for smaller ﬁrms, ﬁrms in less distorted ﬁ-
nancial markets, and ﬁrms without access to international ﬁnancial mar-
kets or preferred access to credit. Capital controls can insulate an economy
from competitive forces, reducing market discipline and hindering the eﬃ-
cient allocation of capital through several channels. Capital controls can
also cause widespread distortions in behavior, aﬀecting multinationals,
domestic companies, and individuals. Moreover, administering capital
controls requires a recurrent cost by the government, especially to enforce
the regulations and update rules to close loopholes. These widespread
eﬀects of capital controls suggest that even though they may yield limited
beneﬁts in certain circumstances, they also have substantial and often un-
expected economic costs. Capital controls are no free lunch.
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Comment Charles W. Calomiris
Kristin Forbes oﬀers a compelling case for the proposition that capital
controls generally impose signiﬁcant economic costs, and more—she pro-
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Charles W. Calomiris is the Henry Kaufman Professor of Financial Institutions in the
Graduate School of Business, Columbia University, and a research associate of the National
Bureau of Economic Research.vides an illuminating review of the microeconomic empirical literature that
nicely summarizes the various channels through which capital controls
harm the economy. Forbes does not argue against potential beneﬁts from
capital controls, but rather cautions against advocating capital controls
only on the basis of arguments or evidence suggesting that they may have
gross beneﬁts.
The various channels she describes remind us that ﬁnancial-sector poli-
cies alter economic outcomes not only through their immediate eﬀects on
the ﬂow of investment, but also through important indirect eﬀects on the
productivity of investment, which operate through market competition
and discipline, political economic outcomes, and the costs ﬁrms expend to
avoid ﬁnancial constraints. The methodological point of the paper—that
macroeconomic studies of capital controls using cross-country aggregate
data are prone to error because of diﬃculties of measurement—bears em-
phasis, as do the unambiguous results of the microeconomic empirical lit-
erature, which does not suﬀer similar measurement problems.
Some of the evidence summarized by Forbes does not directly address
the consequences of capital controls, but rather examines the eﬀects of ﬁ-
nancial controls of many kinds on ﬁnancial and real outcomes at the ﬁrm
level. But there are many studies that do bear directly on the question of
the costliness of capital controls.
Chari and Henry (2004) ﬁnd that equity market liberalizations (the re-
moval of capital controls relating to equity markets) are associated with
very large positive price eﬀects on domestic stock prices, which are espe-
cially large for those in which foreigners are able to invest. Related macro-
economic work by Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2004, 2005), ﬁnds that
equity market liberalizations spur economic growth and reduce consump-
tion volatility; signiﬁcantly, they show that these positive eﬀects associated
with international liberalization of equity markets are not explained by
other (potentially correlated) ﬁnancial reforms.
Harrison, Love, and McMillan (2004) ﬁnd that capital account restric-
tions increase ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing constraints, especially for domestically
owned ﬁrms. Similarly, Forbes (2003) and Gallego and Hernández (2003)
show that Chile’s encaje reduced the use of debt ﬁnance, increased ﬁrms’
reliance on retained earnings and costly equity oﬀerings, and reduced in-
vestment growth, particularly for smaller ﬁrms (those most likely to face
external ﬁnancing constraints). Johnson and Mitton (2002) show that
Malaysia’s capital controls favored politically connected ﬁrms by remov-
ing the discipline of the marketplace that would otherwise have steered re-
sources elsewhere. Desai, Foley, and Hines (2004) show that, on average,
capital controls raise the cost of funds and reduce investments by multina-
tional ﬁrms in a manner comparable to a 24 percent increase in the corpo-
rate tax rate.
The notion that capital controls are costly also ﬁnds support from other
200 Kristin J. Forbesstudies, especially the economic history literature, which emphasizes the
positive eﬀects of Western European capital outﬂows (largely from Great
Britain) in promoting global economic growth in the pre-World War I era
(see Calomiris 2005 for a review). From the perspective of the unambigu-
ously favorable macroeconomic historical evidence on capital mobility, the
ambiguity of the macroeconomic evidence from the post-World War II era
is quite revealing.
In my view, that diﬀerence points to incentive problems in ﬁnancial reg-
ulation in the current era (especially generous safety nets for domestic
banks) as the main problem in need of a policy remedy, rather than capital
ﬂows per se. Emerging market ﬁnancial crises (in which so-called sudden
stops of capital can be an important exacerbating inﬂuence) have been as-
sociated with overreliance on short-term, dollar-denominated debt in-
ﬂows—a form of international ﬁnancial ﬂow that reﬂects a weak domestic
ﬁnancing system, and a form of capital inﬂow that was extremely uncom-
mon historically. In part, the absence of such destabilizing capital ﬂows his-
torically reﬂected the fact that historical banking systems, even in emerg-
ing market countries, largely avoided incentive problems from government
protection.
Is it possible to avoid the costs of destabilizing capital ﬂows without giv-
ing up the advantages of accessing foreign capital? Yes. Rather than em-
ploying costly limits on capital inﬂows to emerging market countries, pol-
icy should instead focus on ways to improve the underlying problem of
weak domestic bank regulation and thus overcome perverse incentives cre-
ated by government policies that encourage the reliance on destabilizing
forms of foreign capital.
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